Property Dualism - AQA A-Level Philosophy Revision Summary

This resource contains everything students and teachers alike need to learn or teach the “Property Dualism” area of the AQA A-Level Philosophy specification. It contains the following information:

There are at least some mental properties that are neither reducible to nor supervenient upon physical properties.

The ‘philosophical zombies’ argument for property dualism (David Chalmers).

Responses including:

a ‘philosophical zombie’/a ‘zombie’ world is not conceivable
what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible
what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world.
The ‘knowledge/Mary’ argument for property dualism (Frank Jackson).

Responses including:

Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain ability knowledge (the ‘ability knowledge’ response).
Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain acquaintance knowledge (the ‘acquaintance knowledge’ response).
Mary gains new propositional knowledge, but this is knowledge of physical facts that she already knew in a different way (the ‘New Knowledge / Old Fact’ response).