1. Mental states, Substance Dualism and Dualism responses 5/12 mark answers.

AQA PHILOSOPHY
3.4 METAPHYSICS OF MIND

Example answers for the following part of the specification:

What do we mean by ‘mind’?
-Features of mental states:
-All or at least some mental states have phenomenal properties
-Some, but not all, philosophers use the term ‘qualia’ to refer to these properties, where ‘qualia’ are defined as ‘intrinsic and non-intentional phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible’
-All or at least some mental states have intentional properties (ie intentionality).

Dualist theories
Substance dualism

-Minds exist and are not identical to bodies or to parts of bodies.
-The indivisibility argument for substance dualism (Descartes).

Responses, including:
-the mental is divisible in some sense
-not everything thought of as physical is divisible.

-The conceivability argument for substance dualism (expressed without reference to God) (Descartes).

Responses including:
-mind without body is not conceivable
-what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible
-what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world.

Issues facing interactionist dualism, including:
-the conceptual interaction problem (as articulated by Elisabeth, Princess of Bohemia)
-the empirical interaction problem.

Issues facing epiphenomenalist dualism, including:
-the challenge posed by introspective self-knowledge
-the challenge posed by the phenomenology of our mental life (ie as involving causal connections, both psychological and psycho-physical)

Issues facing dualism, including:
-The problem of other minds
-Dualism makes a “category mistake” (Gilbert Ryle)

Dualist responses including:
-the argument from analogy
-the existence of other minds is the best hypothesis.