<p>AQA PHILOSOPHY<br /> 3.4 METAPHYSICS OF MIND</p> <p>Example answers for the following part of the specification:</p> <p><strong>What do we mean by ‘mind’?</strong><br /> -Features of mental states:<br /> -All or at least some mental states have phenomenal properties<br /> -Some, but not all, philosophers use the term ‘qualia’ to refer to these properties, where ‘qualia’ are defined as ‘intrinsic and non-intentional phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible’<br /> -All or at least some mental states have intentional properties (ie intentionality).</p> <p><strong>Dualist theories</strong><br /> <strong>Substance dualism</strong></p> <p>-Minds exist and are not identical to bodies or to parts of bodies.<br /> -The indivisibility argument for substance dualism (Descartes).</p> <p><strong>Responses, including:</strong><br /> -the mental is divisible in some sense<br /> -not everything thought of as physical is divisible.</p> <p>-The conceivability argument for substance dualism (expressed without reference to God) (Descartes).</p> <p><strong>Responses including:</strong><br /> -mind without body is not conceivable<br /> -what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible<br /> -what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world.</p> <p><strong>Issues facing interactionist dualism, including:</strong><br /> -the conceptual interaction problem (as articulated by Elisabeth, Princess of Bohemia)<br /> -the empirical interaction problem.</p> <p><strong>Issues facing epiphenomenalist dualism, including:</strong><br /> -the challenge posed by introspective self-knowledge<br /> -the challenge posed by the phenomenology of our mental life (ie as involving causal connections, both psychological and psycho-physical)</p> <p><strong>Issues facing dualism, including:</strong><br /> -The problem of other minds<br /> -Dualism makes a “category mistake” (Gilbert Ryle)</p> <p><strong>Dualist responses including:</strong><br /> -the argument from analogy<br /> -the existence of other minds is the best hypothesis.</p>

<p>AQA PHILOSOPHY<br /> 3.4 METAPHYICS OF MIND</p> <p><strong>Please note, this is not a completed worksheet. It is left blank for students to complete using the Metaphysics of Mind textbook, Routledge, Michael Lacewing</strong></p> <p><strong>Worksheet for the following part of the specification:</strong></p> <p><strong>Dualist theories<br /> Substance dualism</strong><br /> -Minds exist and are not identical to bodies or to parts of bodies.<br /> -The indivisibility argument for substance dualism (Descartes).</p> <p><strong>Responses, including:</strong><br /> -the mental is divisible in some sense<br /> -not everything thought of as physical is divisible.<br /> -The conceivability argument for substance dualism (expressed without reference to God) (Descartes).</p> <p><strong>Responses including:</strong><br /> -mind without body is not conceivable<br /> -what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible<br /> -what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world.</p> <p><strong>Issues facing dualism as a whole<br /> Issues facing dualism, including:</strong><br /> -The problem of other minds<br /> -Dualism makes a “category mistake” (Gilbert Ryle)</p> <p><strong>Responses including:</strong><br /> -the argument from analogy<br /> -the existence of other minds is the best hypothesis.</p> <p><strong>Issues facing interactionist dualism, including:</strong><br /> -the conceptual interaction problem (as articulated by Elisabeth, Princess of Bohemia)<br /> -the empirical interaction problem.</p> <p><strong>Issues facing epiphenomenalist dualism, including:</strong><br /> -the challenge posed by introspective self-knowledge<br /> -the challenge posed by the phenomenology of our mental life (ie as involving causal connections, both psychological and psycho-physical)<br /> -(not included) the challenge posed by natural selection/evolution.</p>