This resource contains everything students and teachers alike need to learn or teach the “Functionalism” area of the AQA A-Level Philosophy specification. It contains the following information: Functionalism: all mental states can be characterised in terms of functional roles which can be multiply realised. Issues, including: the possibility of a functional duplicate with different qualia (inverted qualia) the possibility of a functional duplicate with no mentality/qualia (Ned Block’s China thought experiment) the ‘knowledge’/Mary argument can be applied to functional facts (no amount of facts about function suffices to explain qualia).

This resource contains everything students and teachers alike need to learn or teach the “Eliminative Materialism” area of the AQA A-Level Philosophy specification. It contains the following information: Some or all common-sense (“folk-psychological”) mental states/properties do not exist and our common-sense understanding is radically mistaken (as defended by Patricia Churchland and Paul Churchland). Issues including: our certainty about the existence of our mental states takes priority over other considerations folk-psychology has good predictive and explanatory power (and so is the best hypothesis) the articulation of eliminative materialism as a theory is self-refuting.

This resource contains everything students and teachers alike need to learn or teach the “Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory” area of the AQA A-Level Philosophy specification. It contains the following information: All mental states are identical to brain states (‘ontological’ reduction) although ‘mental state’ and ‘brain state’ are not synonymous (so not an ‘analytic’ reduction). Issues including: dualist arguments applied to mind-brain type identity theory issues with providing the type identities (the multiple realisability of mental states).

This resource contains everything students and teachers alike need to learn or teach the “Physical Behaviourism” area of the AQA A-Level Philosophy specification. It contains the following information: ‘Hard’ behaviourism: all propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning to propositions that exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily states/movements (including Carl Hempel). ‘Soft’ behaviourism: propositions about mental states are propositions about behavioural dispositions (ie propositions that use ordinary language) (including Gilbert Ryle). Issues including: the distinctness of mental states from behaviour (including Hilary Putnam’s ‘Super-Spartans’ and perfect actors) issues defining mental states satisfactorily due to (a) circularity and (b) the multiple realisability of mental states in behaviour the asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other people’s mental states.

This resource contains everything students and teachers alike need to learn or teach the “Issues Facing Dualism” area of the AQA A-Level Philosophy specification. It contains the following information: Issues facing dualism, including: The problem of other minds Responses including: the argument from analogy the existence of other minds is the best hypothesis. Dualism makes a “category mistake” (Gilbert Ryle) Issues facing interactionist dualism, including: the conceptual interaction problem (as articulated by Elisabeth, Princess of Bohemia) the empirical interaction problem. Issues facing epiphenomenalist dualism, including: the challenge posed by introspective self-knowledge the challenge posed by the phenomenology of our mental life (ie as involving causal connections, both psychological and psycho-physical) the challenge posed by natural selection/evolution.

This resource contains everything students and teachers alike need to learn or teach the “Property Dualism” area of the AQA A-Level Philosophy specification. It contains the following information: There are at least some mental properties that are neither reducible to nor supervenient upon physical properties. The ‘philosophical zombies’ argument for property dualism (David Chalmers). Responses including: a ‘philosophical zombie’/a ‘zombie’ world is not conceivable what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world. The ‘knowledge/Mary’ argument for property dualism (Frank Jackson). Responses including: Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain ability knowledge (the ‘ability knowledge’ response). Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain acquaintance knowledge (the ‘acquaintance knowledge’ response). Mary gains new propositional knowledge, but this is knowledge of physical facts that she already knew in a different way (the ‘New Knowledge / Old Fact’ response).

This resource contains everything students and teachers alike need to learn or teach the “Substance Dualism” area of the AQA A-Level Philosophy specification. It contains the following information: Minds exist and are not identical to bodies or to parts of bodies. The indivisibility argument for substance dualism (Descartes). Responses, including: the mental is divisible in some sense not everything thought of as physical is divisible. The conceivability argument for substance dualism (expressed without reference to God) (Descartes). Responses including: mind without body is not conceivable what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world.

This resource contains everything students and teachers alike need to learn or teach the “Religious Language” area of the AQA A-Level Philosophy specification. It contains the following information: The distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism about religious language. The empiricist/logical positivist challenges to the status of metaphysical (here, religious) language: the verification principle and verification/falsification (Ayer). Hick’s response to Ayer (eschatological verification) and issues arising from that response. Further responses: the ‘University Debate’ Anthony Flew on falsification (Wisdom’s ‘Gardener’) Basil Mitchell’s response to Flew (the Partisan) Hare’s response to Flew (bliks and the lunatic)

This resource contains everything students and teachers alike need to learn or teach the “The Problem of Evil” area of the AQA A-Level Philosophy specification. It contains the following information: Whether God’s attributes can be reconciled with the existence of evil. The nature of moral evil and natural evil. The logical and evidential forms of the problem of evil. Responses to these issues and issues arising from these responses, including: the Free Will Defence (including Alvin Plantinga) soul-making (including John Hick).

This resource contains everything students and teachers alike need to learn or teach the “Indirect Realism” area of the AQA A-Level Philosophy specification. It contains the following information: The Kalām argument (an argument from temporal causation). Aquinas’ 1st Way (argument from motion), 2nd Way (argument from atemporal causation) and 3rd way (an argument from contingency). Descartes’ argument based on his continuing existence (an argument from causation). Leibniz’s argument from the principle of sufficient reason (an argument from contingency). Issues that may arise for the arguments above, including: the possibility of an infinite series Hume’s objection to the ‘causal principle’ the argument commits the fallacy of composition (Russell) the impossibility of a necessary being (Hume and Russell).

This resource contains everything students and teachers alike need to learn or teach the “Design Arguments” area of the AQA A-Level Philosophy specification. It contains the following information: The design argument from analogy (as presented by Hume). William Paley’s design argument: argument from spatial order/purpose. Richard Swinburne’s design argument: argument from temporal order/regularity. Issues that may arise for the arguments above, including: Hume’s objections to the design argument from analogy the problem of spatial disorder (as posed by Hume and Paley) the design argument fails as it is an argument from a unique case (Hume) whether God is the best or only explanation.

This resource contains everything students and teachers alike need to learn or teach the “Ontological Arguments” area of the AQA A-Level Philosophy specification. It contains the following information: St Anselm’s ontological argument. Descartes’ ontological argument. Norman Malcolm’s ontological argument. Issues that may arise for the arguments above, including: Gaunilo’s ‘perfect island’ objection Empiricist objections to a priori arguments for existence Kant’s objection based on existence not being a predicate.

This resource contains everything students and teachers alike need to learn or teach the “The Concept & Nature of God” area of the AQA A-Level Philosophy specification. It contains the following information: God’s attributes: God as omniscient, omnipotent, supremely good (omnibenevolent), and the meaning(s) of these divine attributes competing views on such a being’s relationship to time, including God being timeless (eternal) and God being within time (everlasting). arguments for the incoherence of the concept of God including: the paradox of the stone the Euthyphro dilemma the compatibility, or otherwise, of the existence of an omniscient God and free human beings.

This resource contains everything students and teachers alike need to learn or teach the “Moral Anti-Realism” area of the AQA A-Level Philosophy specification. It contains the following information: There are no mind-independent moral properties/facts. Error Theory (cognitivist) - Mackie Emotivism (non-cognitivist) – Ayer Prescriptivism (non-cognitivist) – Richard Hare Issues that may arise for the theories above, including: whether anti-realism can account for how we use moral language, including moral reasoning, persuading, disagreeing etc. the problem of accounting for moral progress whether anti-realism becomes moral nihilism.

This resource contains everything students and teachers alike need to learn or teach the “Moral Realism” area of the AQA A-Level Philosophy specification. It contains the following information: There are mind-independent moral properties/facts. Moral naturalism (cognitivist) – including naturalist forms of utilitarianism (including Bentham) and of virtue ethics. Moral non-naturalism (cognitivist) – including intuitionism and Moore’s ‘open question argument’ against all reductive metaethical theories and the Naturalistic Fallacy. Issues that may arise for the theories above, including: Hume’s Fork and A J Ayer’s verification principle Hume’s argument that moral judgements are not beliefs since beliefs alone could not motivate us Hume’s is-ought gap John Mackie’s argument from relativity and his arguments from queerness.

This resource contains everything students and teachers alike need to learn or teach the “Aristotelian Virtue Ethics” area of the AQA A-Level Philosophy specification. It contains the following information: ‘The good’ for human beings: the meaning of Eudaimonia as the ‘final end’ and the relationship between Eudaimonia and pleasure. The function argument and the relationship between virtues and function. Aristotle’s account of virtues and vices: virtues as character traits/dispositions; the role of education/habituation in the development of a moral character; the skill analogy; the importance of feelings; the doctrine of the mean and its application to particular virtues. Moral responsibility: voluntary, involuntary and non-voluntary actions. The relationship between virtues, actions and reasons and the role of practical reasoning/practical wisdom. Issues including: whether Aristotelian virtue ethics can give sufficiently clear guidance about how to act clashing/competing virtues the possibility of circularity involved in defining virtuous acts and virtuous persons in terms of each other whether a trait must contribute to Eudaimonia in order to be a virtue; the relationship between the good for the individual and moral good.